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I. Law and Law and
Professor Posner's sketch has, I am sure, captured a widely shared
view of the legal academy. In the foreground, behold a milling herd
of well-groomed doctrinal analysts, curiously in decline. In the back-
ground, glimpse a gathering horde of slovenly social scientists and
humanists practicing a bewildering variety of "law and . . ."s, surpris-
ingly on the rise.
I think that this picture is misleading. Not that Professor Posner
is wrong in thinking that something important is afoot. But it is a
mistake to think of the change as a shift from doctrinal analysis to
nondoctrinal musings. What is going on is a shift from one kind of
doctrinal analysis to another kind of doctrinal analysis. Speaking very
broadly, the newer sorts of analysis are characterized by a more self-
conscious and elaborate conceptual apparatus than the kinds they
are displacing. As a consequence, it is no surprise that the newer
doctrinal analysts have been borrowing heavily from other parts of
the university-where professors are paid to develop elaborate con-
ceptual schemes for scientific empirical description and adequate
normative evaluation. Yet the primary purpose of the modem law
professor remains much as it was in the past: to provide disciplined
methods for evaluating the flow of legal decisions and to train stu-
dents in these methods so that they will intelligently practice them
in their professional lives.1 Guido Calabresi is different from William
Prosser; Frank Michelman is different from Alexander Bickel. But
nothing is gained, and much is lost, by saying that Prosser and Bickel
t Professor of Law, Yale University. I am grateful to Mirjan Damalka, Joseph Gold-
stein, Arthur Leff, Richard Posner, and George Priest for their helpful comments on an
earlier draft.
1. It is true, of course, that a small number of law professors are also concerned with
issues that are very distant from doctrinal analysis, however conceived. And it may
well be that this group is larger in absolute numbers today than it was, say, during
the heyday of the Legal Realists. Because the overall size of the professoriat has ex.
panded greatly since then, it is less clear that the group of anti- (and supra-) doctrinal
analysts constitutes a larger percentage of the total today than it did a generation ago.
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were doctrinal analysts, while Calabresi and Michelman are not.2 In-
deed, it is only when this stark contrast is abandoned that the genuine-
ly important question appears: what precisely are the differences in
analytic approach that divide the new generation of legal scholars
from their predecessors?
I will not attempt an elaborate answer to this question within the
space of a short comment.3 Rather than analyzing the new forms of
analysis, I will try to exemplify them. Since I number myself amongst
the interdisciplinary scavengers who are piecing together a distinctive
form of doctrinal analysis, I shall do what comes naturally and analyze
the problem posed for this symposium-legal scholarship-with the
aid of some of the new tools honed in the academy over the past
generation. By turning these tools upon their practitioners, we may
learn something that might otherwise elude us.
II. The Present State of Legal Scholarship (As Viewed by
a Lawyer-Economist)
A. Incentives
Begin with the forms of professional compensation. Law teachers
receive much of their income in two currencies other than hard cash.
Call the first freedom: professors are obliged to show up in the class-
room only a few hours a week, thirty weeks a year, and to grade some
final exams. After tenure is obtained, all other obligations can be
easily evaded. Call the second currency fame: not only among the
captive audience of law students, but in the larger professional com-
munity, as our students become practitioners and our articles become
legal citations.
Note, moreover, that the mix of these currencies changes over the
2. Indeed, I am quite surprised to learn that Professor Posner does not consider
himself primarily a doctrinal analyst. See Posner, The Present Situation in Legal Schol-
arship, 90 YALE L.J. 1113, 1115 (1981) [hereinafter cited as Posner, Present Situation].
Although I have not attempted a precise page count, I would guess that the number
of Posner-pages devoted to the analysis of legal doctrine far exceeds the number devoted
to the scientific examination of the legal system. Indeed, even Professor Posner's most
"scientific" papers investigating the efficiency of the common law are hardly devoid of
doctrinal motivation, given his explicit endorsement of wealth-maximization as the
ultimate test of good law. See Posner, Utilitarianism, Economics, and Legal Theory, 8
J. LEGAL STUD. 103 (1979).
3. For preliminary efforts, see B. ACKERMAN, PRIVATE PROPERTY AND THE CONSTITUTION
(1977), Ackerman, Four Questions for Legal Theory, in NoMos XXII, PROPERTY 351
(J. Pennock & J. Chapman eds. 1980) (Yearbook of the American Society for Political
and Legal Philosophy) [hereinafter cited as Ackerman, Four Questions], and Ackerman,
The Structure of Subchapter C: An Anthropological Comment, 87 YALE L.J. 436 (1977).
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course of the typical academic career. In the beginning, freedom and
fame are at a minimum. It takes a lot of time for novices to do a
credible job in class and to write the customary tenure article (or
two). And an "unknown," by definition, isn't famous. Although
entering academics certainly do dream of their future fame and free-
dom, they must compute the present value of these dreams by apply-
ing a heavy discount rate and risk premium. And that leads us to
a first curiosity: since the present value of fame and freedom is at a
minimum for the beginner, it is the "idealistic" assistant professor
who receives a cash salary closest to the pay offered comparable lawyers
by law firms.
The young professor benefits from law firm competition in a sec-
ond way. In their effort to minimize salary costs, even elite law
schools try to increase the present value the youngsters attach to their
future fame and freedom by reducing their uncertainty. Hence the
scandal of law school tenure practices. Rather than reserving tenured
professorships for men and women who have already made substantial
(if not, perhaps, significant) contributions to scholarship, law schools
go out of their way to assure hot prospects that they will be promoted
quickly if they perform acceptably in the classroom and produce a
"promising" article or two.
This means that the beginning full professor of law will have a
profile very different from that of his counterpart in the faculty of
arts and sciences. A philosopher, say, is lucky if he has received tenure
in a good university by the age of thirty-five. At that point, he has
already written a number of pieces that have gained his peers' grudg-
ing respect; equally important, there is no better way for him to in-
crease his fame, fortune, and freedom (by getting a job at a really
elite place) than by publishing more and better. Not to say that every
philosopher responds to these incentives by prosecuting an ambitious
scholarly project to its successful conclusion. Sloth and academic pol-
itics are competing seductions. Nonetheless, the contrast with the full
professor of law is stark.4 Most obviously, our professor is often re-
markably youthful. Sometimes he has not even developed the basic
scholarly skills: the knack of defining fruitful topics, the ability to
spend lonely hours seeing one's ideas fall apart, the sense of when
4. A fuller treatment would take into account academic fields that fall between the
poles of philosophy and law in terms of consulting opportunities. For example, professors
of economics have begun to exploit consulting options that rival those available to law
professors. A comparative investigation of these two fields might afford us a clearer
understanding of the importance of different institutional factors (for example, the
requirement of a thesis in economics) in accounting for observable differences in scholarly
output by the two professions.
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to junk a project and when to trudge on in hope of inspiration. It
is even more likely that he has never experienced the peculiar joy
that follows publication-when others begin, ever so slowly, to take
your work seriously enough to (ab)use it.
Indeed, premature promotion often generates a very different emo-
tion: the young "scholar" is fearful that if he continues to publish
beyond his tenure exercises, others will begin publicly to observe
what he himself secretly suspects-that the emperor has no clothes.
Even if he is not paralyzed by fear, the youthful law professor can
only guess at his future promise as a serious scholar-by hypothesis, he
has never developed a scholarly agenda more ambitious than a single
article. Hence he must apply a heavy risk premium to his future in-
vestments in long-term scholarship to reflect his own uncertainty about
his academic potential. Here too he differs from his counterpart in
other university departments, whose past scholarly record provides
better information by which to predict the future.
At the same time, the opportunity cost of long-term, high-risk schol-
arship is far higher for the law professor than for most other academics.
Rather than making it difficult to gain immediate fame and fortune
by extrascholarly pursuits, a university connection gives the lawyer-
professor competitive advantages over his friends in private practice.
Typically, they must contend with partners who, as a result of profit
sharing arrangements, have a financial interest in forcing each part-
ner to forego his self-interest when it conflicts with the firm's interest
in long-run profit-maximization.5 In contrast, the lawyer-professor is
the last of the solo practitioners: he can chart his own career to maxi-
mize his own fame and fortune, and nobody else's. Even better, he
obtains this precious freedom without sacrificing the economies of
scale that force others into partnership. His library is far better than
any law firm's, and he gets it for free. His brightest students provide
help comparable to that generated by superior law firm associates,
at little or no cost.6 His colleagues will provide valuable information
on collateral legal issues, once again for free. And finally, the pro-
fessor can often exploit an institutional reputation that even the most
prestigious law firms may rightly envy. While a law partnership must
work for years before its firm name becomes a valuable asset, the law
professor basks in the glow of his law school's reputation-a reputation
created by the professional success of earlier generations of students,
no less than teachers. What is more, law professors trade on a univer-
sity name built up by historians, classicists, and theoretical physicists.
5. See W. KLWN, BusINEss ORGANIZATION AND FINANCE 61-69 (1980).
6. Sometimes a glowing letter of recommendation will suffice.
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We put ourselves forward as professors of law at Yale University (to
pick a name at random). Yet even knowledgeable outsiders do not
always recognize that lawyers become professors on the basis of a
publication standard that embarasses their colleagues in the rest of
the university.
Small wonder, then, that law professors find themselves in high
demand in the marketplace for legal services. Although hourly rates
are a closely guarded secret, my own experience suggests that profes-
sors from "name" law schools are often offered rates equal to those
charged by senior partners at leading firms. And professors get to
keep all their fees, while partners have to pay for an immense overheadl
B. The Production of Legal Scholarship
Given this incentive structure, positive economic analysis permits
a set of striking predictions. Not only can we say something about
the overall level of scholarly output, but we can predict both the
kinds of "scholarship" a professor will produce over the course of his
career and the kinds of law school that will be congenial to different
varieties of scholarship.
1. Quantity
Legal academia will be full of full professors who fail to fulfill the
promise of one or two "promising" articles published at an early age.
The publication curve of the modal law professor will resemble that
of the professor of mathematics, who also burns out early. For the
mathematician, the explanation lies in the remorseless decay of the
higher analytic capacities of the human mind;7 the law professor's
apology, however, cannot be of the same kind. As long ago as Aris-
totle,8 it was clear that legal analysis was an art that should grow in
depth and breadth with the years. The young professor's academic
decline and fall is a tribute to the power of the marketplace to tri-
umph over the natural progress of the human mind.
2. Quality
Even those law professors who continue to produce scholarship after
tenure will not stray far from "the logic of the opinion or the series
of opinions that they are examining."9 This is so for three reasons.
First, such articles will be promptly cited by lawyers and judges try-
7. See G. H. HAIY, A MATiEMAI CAN's APoLOGy (rev. ed. 1969).
8. Aixs'rorm, NicHOMACHEAN ETHics, lines 1094b-1095a.
9. See Posner, Present Situation, supra note 2, at 1114.
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ing to minimize their own transaction costs. Citation, in turn, will
advertise the scholar's wares and increase his market value as a con-
sultant in the next round of legal activity. In contrast, an article
using unfamiliar categories will be used as decisional authority only
after a long delay, if at all. Hence, the fame and fortune gained by
its publication will be subjected to a heavy discount. Second, insofar
as professors practice law, it will be cheaper for them to reflect on
the categories they encounter in their consulting work than to spend
time thinking up more enlightening ways to formulate legal ques-
tions and solutions. Third, the practitioner role may become so
dominant that clients may pay lawyer-professors to publish articles
in law journals in the hope that a "scholarly" article will seem more
persuasive to courts than the same material submitted in a brief.
This blurring of the line between scholarship and brief-writing is
predictable regardless of the kind of doctrinal analysis in vogue. If
concepts drawn from economics become important in one or another
doctrinal area, scholarship in law and economics should be expected
to resemble advocate's briefs no less than did more traditional forms
of doctrinal analysis in their heyday. Indeed, there is reason to fear
that economics-oriented discussions will suffer from narrow partisan-
ship even more markedly than the legal scholarship they displace.
Traditionally, the great check on narrow partisanship has been the
conscientiousness of student law review editors, whose professional
incentives lead them to orgies of source checking. Unfortunately,
however, this check will be less effective in weeding out the most
egregious forms of special pleading when they dress themselves up
in language borrowed from the economist. The abuses of this form
of doctrinal analysis will not typically lie in selective or dishonest
citation of sources, but in the partisan manipulation of economic
jargon to reach a predetermined result. Yet, precisely because eco-
nomic argument is technical, it is less likely that a randomly selected
student editor will be able to detect outrageous non sequiturs, let
alone subtler analytic failures that might seem obvious to cognoscenti.
This makes it even more tempting to hire a "scholar" to write an
article on behalf of a client in a pending law suit: if the scholarly
brief gets by a student editor, it will bask in the glow of the repu-
tation for technical competence that the law review has earned through
generations of source checking.
3. Law Schools as Scholarly Workplaces
Not all law schools with equal financial resources will foster the
same sort of scholarship. Some will be dominated by lawyer-professors
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who sometimes find the time to churn out a brief-article; others will
encourage writing that seeks to illuminate and criticize the premises
underlying received legal categories.
The extent to which a law school will encourage this more funda-
mental kind of work will be a function of its size and geographic
location. A professor located in a great legal center like New York,
Washington, or Chicago, can go into lucrative practice at a much
lower transaction cost than an academic located in a legal desert
blessed with poor airline connections. Scholarship is also aided by
a location in an economically declining region, where living costs,
especially real estate prices, are low but university endowments re-
main substantial. Even minor geographic differences may prove sig-
nificant over time as lawyer-professors gravitate toward metropolitan
law schools and legal scholars move to university towns in economi-
cally declining regions.
The significance of law school size is usefully approached through
Mancur Olson's now-familiar logic of collective action.10 To simplify,
assume that each professor is faced with a polar choice. On the one
hand, he may use his free time consulting, not even trying to make
his law school into a genuine scholarly community. On the other
hand, he may spend his free time reading his colleagues' papers,
talking about their ideas, encouraging their ambitious intellectual
projects, and so forth. If he takes the first course and others take the
second, then he will live in the best of both worlds-he can gain
fame and fortune by consulting and intellectual titillation by gabbing
with colleagues whenever he is in the mood. If, however, too many
professors take this free ride, there won't be enough of them around
enough of the time to constitute a vital scholarly community.
It is here where law school size enters. If the law school is large,
each professor knows that his contribution to the scholarly give-and-
take won't make much of a difference to the overall quality of the
academic community; hence, he might as well maximize his individual
fame and fortune by consulting. As faculty size decreases, however,
it becomes increasingly plain to each professor that his own decision
to abandon the life of scholarship will have a perceptible impact
upon the law school's academic atmosphere. Not only does this give
each teacher a greater incentive to allocate more time to supportive
scholarly interchange, but it also gives him an incentive to monitor
the decisions of his colleagues more closely. Whenever somebody be-
gins regularly to leave the law school for parts unknown, this will
10. M. O/soN, THE LoGic OF CoLLcnvE ACTION 53-66 (1965).
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have an immediate impact upon those left behind: they will tend to
view the defection to the world of consulting as a personal betrayal,
no less than an abstract breach of academic ideals. The prospect of
confronting deeply aggrieved colleagues does more, I am sure, to pre-
serve the integrity of a small scholarly community than any sophisti-
cated sanctioning scheme yet devised by the most ingenious legal mind.
III. The Future of Legal Scholarship (or Beyond
Wealth Maximization)
A. Legal Economics as a Form of Doctrinal Analysis
Like all reductionist accounts, positive economic analysis hardly
tells the whole story about legal scholarship. And doubtless, it is one
of the tasks of legal scholarship to explore the complex ways in which
the lawyer-economist's reductionist model inevitably distorts the "re-
ality" he hopes to describe. When inspecting the economist's descrip-
tive model for systemic blindspots, however, it is especially important
for the analyst to avoid the very sins of reductionism that he is so
quick to find in the lawyer-economist.11 In particular, it is far too
simple to assert that the lawyer-economist's adoption of a distinctive
vocabularly inevitably leads him to an uncritical embrace of the status
quo. To the contrary, economic language is one of the most powerful
tools of criticism available to American lawyers. By describing the
way self-seeking individuals respond to the existing legal regime, posi-
tive economic analysis can shock us into action-forcing us to con-
front the kind of people we may become if we allow ourselves to
drift along with the invisible hand. By emphasizing the way in which
the pursuit of self-interest can erode "reformed" legal regimes, positive
economic analysis permits a hardheaded view of the extent to which
we may sensibly look to legal change to ameliorate our numberless
11. Although this has been a main aim of my own work, see Ackerman, Four Ques-
tions, supra note 3, at 351 (asking four questions, rather than one), I do not imagine
myself to be alone in resisting the lures of reductionism. A variety of writers-very
different in other respects-have contributed to a growing hermeneutic literature that
seeks to clarify the interpretive presuppositions of the lawyer-economist's description
of "reality." See, e.g., Epstein, A Theory of Strict Liability, 2 J. LEGAL Sruo. 151 (1973);
Fletcher, Fairness and Utility in Tort Theory, 85 HARv. L. REv. 537 (1972); Heller, Is the
Charitable Exemption from Property Taxation an Easy Case? General Concerns about
Legal Economics and Jurisprudence, in EssAys ON THE LAW AND ECONOMICS OF LOCAL
GOVERNMENT 183, 183-207 (D. Rubinfeld ed. 1979); Kelman, Spitzer and Hoffman on
Coase: A Brief Rejoinder, 53 S. CAL. L. REv. 1215 (1980); Michelman, Political Markets
and Community Self-Determination: Competing Judicial Models of Local Government
Legitimacy, 53 IND. L.J. 145 (1977-1978).
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afflictions-a talent that would, I suspect, be no less useful in a so-
cialist democracy than it is in a capitalist republic.
The story I have told, for example, describes the systematic impact
that a series of rules and practices-relating to promotion, consulting,
and publication-can have on the amount and kind of legal schol-
arship produced by the professoriat. Rather than serving as an elabo-
rate apologia for the status quo, this story has permitted us to isolate
a set of thoroughly undesirable incentive structures. Analytically
speaking, we are in the delightful presence of an "easy case"-one in
which the prevailing rules and practices seem bad on any plausible
view of the public good. What, then, is to be done?
B. Beyond Wealth Maximization
Even for those like Professor Posner who aim for wealth maximi-
zation, the failure of the existing marketplace of legal ideas should
be obvious. Simply put, neither the bench nor the bar has much of
an incentive to do the hard thinking required to place an individual
case in a broad perspective-whether the perspective be doctrinal,
philosophical, historical, or economic in character. Although judges
may read a few articles that try to do this job for them, they hardly
have the time for independent exercises in wide-ranging reconceptu-
alization. And so long as lawyers are paid by clients, and pressed by
deadlines, they will have neither the time nor the inclination to ex-
plore "tangential" legal issues-especially when a broader perspective
may well reveal unsuspected weaknesses in their case as easily as un-
suspected strengths. If, despite these dangers, an odd lawyer perseveres
in high-risk reconceptualization, it is most unlikely that a court will
accept a novel legal argument on its initial presentation. Most prob-
ably, such an enterprise will only serve to win somebody else's case
ten or twenty years from now; but typically, the innovative lawyer
will have no way to induce these remote beneficiaries to pay the
cost of his early legal activities on their behalf.12
In other areas, the patent system provides innovators with the in-
12. See generally Landes & Posner, Adjudication as a Private Good, 8 J. LEGAL STm.
235 (1979). To the extent that institutional litigants, like large corporations and public
interest law firms, self-consciously plan litigation strategies extending over a decade
or more, the market failure described in the text is somewhat ameliorated. Although
such long-range planning is hardly unknown, see Galanter, Why the "Haves" Come Out
Ahead: Speculations on the Limits of Legal Change, 9 LAw & Soc'y REv. 95, 100-03
(1974) (parties who are repeatedly involved in litigation have interest in establishment
of favorable laws over time), it nonetheless remains the exception, rather than the
rule, in most areas of law.
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centives they need to sustain the research enterprise.' 3 Yet there are
obvious problems in extending this solution to the market failures
afflicting innovative legal research. Rather than giving a legal inno-
vator a patent on his ideas, the wealth-maximizer should call upon
the legal academy to provide a plausible institutional response to the
market failure we have described. By encouraging professors to em-
bark on broad-gauged, high-risk scholarship, a university law school
maximizes overall wealth as it fulfills its own highest academic ideals.
Moreover, every day the academy fails to reform its own rules regu-
lating tenure, consulting, and publication, it runs the risk of a far
greater danger. Perhaps the time will come when the courts will heed
Professor Posner's call for efficiency and force a sweeping reform on
academics who are maximizing their own wealth at the expense of
society's. Yet close judicial supervision of professorial activity trans-
parently endangers fundamental principles of academic freedom-
principles that doubtless have their wealth-maximizing aspect as well.
For efficiency-buffs, then, the optimal solution is clear: the law schools
should act on their own to encourage innovative legal research and
thereby avoid the heavy costs generated by the intrusion of efficiency-
minded common-law judges.
The need for serious reform is even clearer to those of us, happily
in the great majority, who believe that American law is committed
to a set of moral principles far more complex and demanding than
pure wealth maximization. Although resistance to the Posnerian ethic
remains strong,14 surely Professor Posner is right in observing that,
at present, there is no single normative framework that guides legal
thought in the same way that pragmatic utilitarianism did a gener-
ation ago.15 A critical academic task, then, is to clarify the competing
ideals currently struggling for ascendancy: by exploring their com-
peting policy implications, by appraising their philosophical founda-
tions, by placing them in historical and cross-cultural context. Legal
scholarship of these kinds will make a unique contribution to the
larger body of citizens who will never step into a law library or glance
at a law review. For they, no less than we, think that the country
13. Arrow, Economic Welfare and the Allocation of Resources for Invention, in THE
RATE AND DIRECTION OF INVENTIvE ACTIVrrY 609 (Universities-National Bureau for Economic
Research 1962).
14. Although I hardly wish to deny that a concern with wealth-maximization ought
to play a significant role in a larger theory of social justice, see B. ACKERMAN, SOCIAL
JUSTICE IN THE LIBERAL STATE 190-95, 200 n.16, 257-61 (1980), I think that Professor Posner
has greatly overextended himself in suggesting that wealth-maximization might serve
as the sole touchstone for legal evaluation. For an outstanding critique, see Dworkin,
Is Wealth A Value? 9 J. LEGAL STUD. 191 (1980).
15. See Posner, Present Situation, supra note 2, at 1126.
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stands for more than wealth maximization and look to the law to
express the nature of these larger commitments. If law professors are
too busy with their law practices to help clarify the legal implications
of the basic value choices before us, who will be doing this critical
work?
Doubtless, the ultimate direction of American law will not be de-
termined by such acts of scholarship alone. It is easy to be cynical,
however, about the scholar's long-term impact. Precisely because the
rest of his brethren in the profession are so busy, they will accept
almost any scholarly guide whose perspective clarifies the flux of
everyday practice-provided, of course, that the scholar's flickering
lamp happens to illuminate the justice of their particular client's
cause. If only a few scholars resist financial temptation, even their
half-baked ideas may have great influence in the long run. The only
remedy for oligopoly in the production of new ideas is more scholarly
competition-full of participants who find engaged dialogue its own
reward.
C. Reform
Although institutional reforms cannot guarantee academic vitality,
a number of steps can help.
1. Tenure
The standards for tenure must be raised. I do not think that this
will dry up the supply of high quality talent. Thanks to the job
crunch in other parts of the university, law schools are attracting
people who would have gone to the graduate school of arts and sci-
ences in balmier days. Even though a more substantial tenure re-
quirement may reduce the percentage of academically inclined law
students who initially choose teaching as a career, a smaller percentage
of a larger pool will yield an entering stream of assistant professors
that is as large as we need. 16 Although it is hard to get a firm grasp
on the elasticity of supply, the time seems ripe to test the issue by
gradually raising the publication standard required for a tenured
professorship.
This shift to more demanding standards will generate transition
costs. There will be painful hypocrisy when senior professors impose
standards on juniors that the seniors themselves cannot pass. There
will be arbitrariness when, during the extended period of transition,
some unlucky juniors fail of promotion while others sneak through
16. Especially since the days of dramatic expansion in law school enrollments are past.
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on work that is roughly comparable in quality and quantity. These
costs, however, are part of the price we must pay for a vigorous aca-
demic life.
It is a price worth paying. A more demanding tenure standard will
not only screen out obvious nonstarters. It will have even more sig-
nificant systemic effects in the longer run. Most important, the impo-
sition of stricter tests for tenured professorships will make it easier
for the law schools to select an academically promising crop of un-
tenured professors. All of us recognize, I think, that we rely too
heavily on law school grades in choosing among prospective law teach
ers. Although a string of bad law school grades is a negative indicator
of scholarly success, I do not think that the person who finishes, say,
tenth in his class at the Harvard Law School will consistently turn
out to be a better scholar than the person who "only" finishes in
sixtieth place. It is not merely that the classic three hour examination
in issue-spotting and on-the-other-handing fails to test powers of
synthetic imagination that are absolutely essential in the scholarly
enterprise. The awful fact is that raw intelligence is not enough to
assure a distinguished scholarly career. A certain kind of character is
no less important-one that permits a person to resist the countless
diversions of everyday life and carry through a scholarly project that,
precisely because it asks new questions, will sometimes seem of doubt-
ful value during the long years required for its completion. To master
the inevitable periods of doubt and depression, the successful legal
scholar must have an ability to defer gratification, to impose his own
deadlines, and to define his own objectives. There is a great need,
if you will, for creative pigheadedness. Yet even the most distinguished
grades do not ensure the existence of this essential characteristic.
The other data that are typically available also have a tea-leaf qual-
ity.17 Although it is encouraging when an applicant has been highly
successful as a law clerk or legal practitioner, this fact cannot bear
the weight sometimes given it. At best, it shows that the applicant
has done an excellent job in shaping and fulfilling the desires and
deadlines expressed by others; it does not show that he will master
the different challenge awaiting him in the clientless world of legal
academia-namely, to impose his own order on the world in a way
that will induce others to reflect anew on the legal categories that
17. Of course, the best evidence of scholarly aptitude is an existing piece of serious
scholarship. Rather than producing such work, however, our best students spend much
of their time on law review dealing with printers, checking each others' sources,
and selecting the next year's editors. As a consequence, it seems unfair to expect them
to produce anything more than a "good student note."
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currently order their perceptions. Who can tell whether one or an-
other plausible sounding young lawyer has the pigheadedness required
for this task?
Surely the person who can guess best is the applicant himself, and
not the senior faculty who are anxiously engaging him in Socratic
questioning during his day of intensive interviewing. And it is here
where a serious tenure standard comes to the rescue. Quite simply,
the prospect of a serious tenure test encourages the applicant himself
to think hard about his own character and whether it will bloom in
an academic environment that is (or ought to be) different from the
client-oriented world of legal practice. To put the point paradoxically:
a young lawyer who pigheadedly accepts an entering position at a
law school that applies a demanding tenure test provides, by his very
acceptance, the best evidence that he is sufficiently pigheaded to thrive
in academic life. In contrast, the present lax standard imposes the
burden of guesswork on the party more likely to make a mistake-the
senior faculty."' By permitting the applicant to externalize much of
the cost of error, the existing tenure system fails to discourage future
lawyer-professors from applying for university jobs.19 As a consequence,
a greater proportion of lawyer-professor types occupy entry level jobs
than would be the case under a more stringent tenure system.
A lax tenure system not only yields a less scholarly mix of assistant
professors at each school, but has an especially harmful impact upon
would-be scholars who were unlucky enough to be rejected by the
elite schools at the time of their initial entry into academia. At a
later stage in their career, some of these people are in a position to
correct initial mistakes-by producing scholarship of a quality and
quantity that puts their luckier competitors to shame. Yet, under the
present system, the top schools persist in promoting their own lawyer-
professors without attempting a serious nationwide search for more
serious scholarly contenders. It would be bad enough if this simply
meant that many fine scholars are forever deprived of the students,
research leaves, and libraries that go with an appointment to a leading
university. The present practice is downright pernicious, however,
in weakening the morale of would-be scholars who find themselves
18. Lawyer.economists will recognize that I am applying a standard Calabresian
move to the problem at hand. See Calabresi & Hirschoff, Toward a Test for Strict Lia-
bility in Torts, 81 YALE IJ. 1055, 1070-74 (1972).
19. It is true, of course, that some potentially great scholars may be deterred by the
prospect of a higher tenure standard and refuse to apply for an assistant professorship
under the new riskier regime. Although one must regret the loss of these timid scholars,
their absence seems a necessary part of the price that must be paid to free academia
from a surplus of lawyer-professors.
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trapped in uncongenial surroundings. Because they know that even
a striking scholarly success is unlikely to gain them a professorship
at a leading place, it is all too easy for them to give up serious work
with the bitter recognition that nobody is watching anyway. The lax
tenure system, then, generates a double distortion: it encourages young
lawyer-professors to flood the elite schools, and it demoralizes serious
scholars in the rest of legal academia.
2. Consulting
A gradual tightening of tenure standards is only a first step toward
academic reform. It is no less important to control tenured professors
who engage in the private practice of law or other forms of outside
consulting. For starters, law schools should actively enforce their uni-
versities' rules restricting consulting. Each professor should be required
to submit a confidential report to his dean, on a regular basis, ex-
plicitly reporting the number of hours he has spent on outside work.
Persistent violations of university-wide limits should be treated as a
most serious breach of academic discipline.
But, of course, the rules themselves should be reappraised. I have
no doubt that some practice and consulting may well enrich some
academics' scholarship and teaching. It does not follow, however, that
the amount of time professors spend on such activities should be left
entirely to the academic conscience of the individuals involved. The
task is to design an incentive scheme that induces each professor to
take into account the external costs imposed on the scholarly com-
munity generated by excessive consulting. Happily, the problem in
institutional design does not require a conceptual breakthrough on
the order of the invention of the wheel. Whatever its limitations in
other contexts, some well-worked lore of the lawyer-economist seems
made-to-order for the problem at hand.
To see the point, begin by viewing consulting as if it raised just
another garden variety issue in externality control-analogize it, say,
to the problem posed by dirty smokestacks. Just as the industrial pol-
luter generates external costs while engaging in profitable activity,
so too does the academic lawyer when he consults to excess. Just as
it would be counterproductive to prohibit all pollution, so too would
it be counterproductive to prohibit all consulting. What is required
is a more discriminating regulatory regime-one that permits some,
but not too much, of the cost-externalizing activity.
In controlling consulting, moreover, it is important to avoid build-
ing an oppressive and inefficient administrative apparatus worse than
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the initial dis-ease itself. We should not create yet another assistant
deanship to police consulting arrangements; we should not force pro-
fessors to convince the new petty bureaucrat of the redeeming social
or academic value of each particular outside relationship. Rather
than permit the further erosion of fragile academic values, we should
take seriously the lawyer-economist's critique of traditional forms of
bureaucratic command and control. On this now-familiar line, the
best cure for market failure is the sensitive reshaping of market sig-
nals to reflect an activity's external costs. In the case of the industrial
polluter, this involves redefining property rights so that firms must
purchase rights to pollute at prices that reflect the external costs they
impose on their neighbors. 20 An analogous redefinition of property
rights is required in the case at hand: professiorial consultants should
make a special payment reflecting the external costs they impose on
the academic community. Of course, the university cannot redefine
property rights by passing a law in the manner of the state; but it
can achieve the same result through the institution of private contract.
All that need be done is to establish a standard profit-sharing agree-
ment as part of the professiorial contract. Under the terms of the
agreement, no professor need ever be obliged to convince some aca-
demic bureaucrat of the redeeming social value of one or another
consulting effort. All he need do is share his profits with the univer-
sity on the basis of a general schedule that reflects his law school's
assessment of the external costs generated by excessive consulting. By
modifying prevailing market signals, profit-sharing protects the in-
tegrity of the academic community without infringing on the freedom
of each professor to determine the value of outside work for his own
scholarly development.
Although one may quibble endlessly over the details of the profit-
sharing schedule, 21 I do not think any professor can plausibly assert
20. A polluter may also be induced to take external costs into account by subjecting
him to a special "effluent tax" based on the marginal costs of his discharge. See C.
SCHULTZE, PUBLIC USE OF PRIVATE INTEREST (1977). For reasons presented in Rose-Acker-
man, Market Models for Pollution Control: Their Strengths and Weaknesses, 25 PUB.
PoL'Y 383 (1977), I think the effluent charge system is often inferior to one in which
a fixed number of pollution rights are sold to the highest bidders.
21. Disagreement on details, however, should not prevent a broad consensus emerg-
ing on the most appropriate shape of the profit-sharing schedule. It seems clear that
the schedule should resemble a "progressive" income tax in allowing professors to keep
a larger share of their first five-thousand dollars of consulting income than their second
five-thousand, and so on.
The case for a "progressive" schedule rests on two judgments. First, the marginal
damage to the academic community-measured in loss of collegiality and decrease in
the quality of scholarly output-increases markedly with the intensity of a professor's
outside engagements. Second, a professor is more likely to ignore his academic con-
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that he has a legitimate expectation to all the consulting income he
chooses to produce. Because a substantial portion of each consulting
fee is attributable to the professor's university connection, it is only
fair that the university recapture some of the gains made by trading
on its name and resources. And as we have seen, not even the wealth-
maximizer can deny that excessive consulting impoverishes legal
scholarship.
Although the notion of a fundamental right to all consulting in-
come seems hollow, there is a more insidious threat that should give
the reformer pause. Once profit-sharing is instituted, the university's
central administration may become addicted to the funds accumulated
annually by lawyer-professors. Rather than viewing a large fund as
an alarming sign of the loss of scholarly commitment, the central
administration may view the fund as a convenient excuse for drain-
ing yet more money out of the law school's coffers for general uni-
versity purposes. Indeed, it is even possible to imagine a university
administration actively encouraging a law school to increase its profit-
sharing fund by recruiting market-tested academic entrepreneurs.
Thus, the profit-sharing proposal might lead in the end to the fur-
ther entrenchment of abusive consulting and the final downfall of
the academic ideal.
I do not wish to deny the possibility of this dismal scenario: eco-
nomics is not called the dismal science for nothing. Yet I do not wish
to draw a despairing conclusion from this intimation of decline and
fall. The story, after all, is only one of many that can be told. Its
telling merely emphasizes the obvious: that, without a commitment
to academic ideals, no clever technique offered by the lawyer-econo-
mist can halt a law school's degradation. Yet, although cleverness is
no substitute for commitment, the reverse is also true. Profit-sharing
will help a committed academic community maintain its integrity;
it will help an ambiguously academic community define its principles
more clearly. And that should be enough of a recommendation.
science when offered a large amount of money than when offered a small one.
To avoid misconception, I should emphasize that the case for progressivity in profit-
sharing has absolutely nothing to do with the case for progressive income taxation. First,
progressive profit-sharing may not have a progressive overall impact. Thus, a noncon-
suiting professor with inherited wealth may earn a million dollars a year and pay
nothing into the profit-sharing fund while another professor, with no independent
means, may be obliged to pay $25,000 of the $40,000 he earns from consulting work.
Such outcomes only emphasize that the rationale for profit-sharing is not income redis-
tribution but externality control
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It remains to confront a final excuse for inaction. Temporizers will
suggest the need to obtain the agreement of all law schools-or at
least most "leading" law schools-before a serious effort can begin to
control consulting abuses. I am convinced, however, that this is the
wrong way to begin realistic reform. As we have seen, economic analy-
sis suggests that abusive consulting will not be equally prevalent at
all law schools. Instead, it will be a function of each law school's
geographic location, its faculty size, its academic traditions, and the
happenstance of its professorial personalities. Moreover, the law schools
with the worst consulting problem will, predictably, be the most re-
luctant to do anything serious about it. They will use the negotiations
required for a joint policy both to delay agreement and to dilute the
principles ultimately enunciated. Further, the effectiveness of any
paper agreement among law schools may be readily overestimated.
The joint policy will inevitably be administered by each law dean,
who will have plenty of room to make low visibility deals if his fac-
ulty wishes to evade the agreement. Academic cartels are no less diffi-
cult to manage than more profitable kinds.
Realistic reform must begin at each individual law school. The fact
that other professors are cashing out their academic freedom at other
law schools is hardly a reason to tolerate the same abuses at our school.
If it is fair for the university to recapture "outside" income generated
by the professor as a result of his university affiliation, it remains
fair to require profit-sharing even though other schools let the traffic
in their names continue unchecked. As things now stand, each law
school must take responsibility for its own future as a scholarly com-
munity: how much will we cherish genuine academic interchange,
how much will we serve as a particularly prestigious law office address?
3. Publication
And while we ask this question, perhaps our students will help us
out-by refusing to publish articles in their law reviews that have
been written to order by scholars in the pay of one of the parties to
a lawsuit. Although an ideal editorial process might filter out all the
distortions and special pleading, I entirely agree with Professor Pos-
ner's bleak assessment of present editorial practices. 22 Especially in
legal fields permeated with social science jargon, student-run reviews
22. See Posner, Present Situation, supra note 2, at 1123-24.
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regularly publish a great deal of incompetent work. While random
publication of bad work is unfortunate, it is intolerable when liti-
gants exploit a weak editorial process to flood the journals with self-
serving propaganda. Although a strict rule against party-commissioned
scholarship will sometimes exclude novel and/or worthwhile insights,
these nuggets can still be transmitted to the courts in the form of a
brief-where they may be mined by judge and law clerk after the
other side is given a fair chance to say what they are worth.
Law reviews are for other things. They are places where we try to
convince one another that there is something to the law beyond mere
self-assertion, and that lawyers must try to describe that something
if their work is to be worthy of their fellow citizens.
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